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INTERNATIONAL LAv - SovEREIGNTY - JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN ACT OF STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw-In retaliation for a reduc-

tion of its sugar quota by the United States' the Cuban government
nationalized certain Cuban enterprises in which United States citizens held
majority interests. 2 Defendant had earlier contracted to purchase a ship-

1 74 Stat. 330, 7 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. II, 1960).
2 Law 851, Official Gazette of Cuba, July 7, 1960. For an English translation see
55 Am. J. INT'L L. 822 (1961). See also Allison, Cuba's Seizures of American Business,
47 A.B.A.J. 48 (1961) ; id. (Part I), 47 A.BA.J. 187 (1961) for a treatment of this and
similar Cuban laws adopted by the revolutionary government.
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ment of sugar from one of the nationalized Cuban corporations. To obtain
permission to remove the shipment from Cuban waters, defendant was
forced to execute another contract with plaintiff's assignor, an agent of the
Cuban government, which agreement embodied terms identical to those
in the original contract with the exception that payment was to be made
to plaintiff's assignor. Upon learning that a receiver of the nationalized
corporation also claimed the right to them,3 defendant paid the proceeds
of the sale into court, and plaintiff brought an action for conversion in
federal district court. On defendant's motion for summary judgment, held,
complaint dismissed. The nationalization decree violated international law
and will not be recognized as having vested title to the sugar in plaintiff's
assignor. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.
N.Y. 1961).
The "act of state" doctrine4 provides that our courts will not inquire
into the validity of official 5 acts of foreign states which affect persons or
property within the acting state when the act occurs. 6 It is a judicially
8
self-imposed limitation 7 which is neither based on lack of jurisdiction
nor required by international law.9 Consistently applied by the courts,10
its historical roots lie in an analogy to the immunity from suit granted
3 The New York Supreme Court had appointed a receiver under § 977 (b) of the
N.Y. Civ. PR.Ac. AcT which authorizes the appointment of receivers for the New York
assets of foreign corporations that have been dissolved or the property of which has been
nationalized.
4 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 US. 250, 252 (1897). See also United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 801 U.S. 824 (1937); Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 US. 297 (1918);
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 847 (1909); Bernstein v. N.Y.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954);
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71
(2d Cir. 1949); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 772 (1947); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.
1940) ; Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 Fed. 367 (2d Cir. 1918).
5 Hewitt v. Speyer, supra note 4, at 871; cf. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 28a (1), comment a at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960). But see Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres, supra note 4, at 249, which allowed examination of official acts with executive permission.
6 Note, Acts of State and the Conflict of Laws, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 234, 235 (1960).
See generally RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1951).
7 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlansche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d
875, 376 (2d Cir. 1954); Note, Acts of State and the Conflict of Laws, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV.
284, 239 (1960).
8 RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 28d (1), comment a at 15 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1960); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826, 831 n.30 (1959).
9 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 267, 268 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 28d(1), comment a at 15 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1960); Comm. on International Law, N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Reconsideration of the Act of
State Doctrine in United States Courts, N.Y.C.B.A. REP. 9 (May 1959).
10 Cases cited note 4 supra. See also RE, op. cit. supra note 6; Comment, 58 MIcH.
L. REv. 100, 106 (1959).
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foreign sovereigns." It is characterized by deference to the executive branch
of the government in areas where judicial action might adversely affect
foreign relations,12 and is thus similar to certain aspects of the Supreme
Court's self-imposed "political question" limitation.13
14 presents the most significant
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres'
recent
development in the traditional application of the doctrine. In that case
the court accepted the principle of non-review of foreign acts of state
because of executive predominance in the field of foreign affairs, but made
it clear that it would feel free to examine such acts if the executive demonstrated an intention to remove judicial restraint.15 That dictum provided
the basis for decision in Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappijwhere a published letter from the acting legal
adviser of the Department of State was held to have lifted the bar to
judicial examination.' 6 This analysis could have been used in the principal
case: the executive had made known its position on the Cuban act, and had
demonstrated an affirmative intent that such act not be recognized.' 7 The
court, however, chose to break new ground by basing its holding on the
proposition that the "act of state" doctrine does not bar examination of
foreign acts of state where such acts violate international law.' 8 This is
a substantial limitation on the scope of the doctrine as normally interpreted.19 The validity of the doctrine depends on an acceptance of the
thesis that deference to the executive may be necessary before a foreign
act should be condemned by the courts as a violation of our municipal
law; but such deference is not required where the legality of the act is to
20
be determined by international law standards.
11 RE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 21; Zander, supra note 8, at 851; Note, Acts of State
and the Conflict of Laws, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 234, 237 (1960).
12 Note, Acts of State and the Conflict of Laws, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 234, 237 (1960).
1s See Comment, 58 MxcH. L. REv. 100, 106-08 (1959), showing similarities and dissimilarities.
14 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 822 U.S. 772 (1947).
15 Id. at 249.
18 210 F.2d 375, 876 (2d Cir. 1954).
17 Principal case at 881. Judge Dimock was apparently aware of this possible approach., See Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 177 F.
Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1954).
18 "There is an end to the right of national sovereignty when the sovereign's acts
impinge on international law." Principal case at 881.
19 The doctrine, as enunciated in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), is
broad enough to include violations of international law. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (dictum), supports this interpretation. Contra, Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1958] 1 Weekly L.R. 246 (Sup. Ct. Aden 1952).
20 "The basis for . . . recognition and respect vanishes, however, when the act of a
foreign state violates, not what may be our provincial notions of policy but rather the
standards imposed by international law." Principal case at 881. It might be argued that
the true basis of decision was the fact that there was no possibility of executive embarrassment in this case, i.e., that the court was tacitly employing the Bernstein analysis.
See ibid. It appears more likely, however, viewing the stated grounds for decision and
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It was the stern necessity of dealing amicably with foreign sovereigns
which gave birth to the "act of state" doctrine. 21 The judiciary does not
wish to take responsibility for a course of action which may affect relations
between this country and another 22 when it has no proper method of
evaluating the consequences. 23 This understandable caution should apply,
however, only to situations where there is likely to be a clearly detrimental
effect on foreign relations24 or where the court's decision could be considered a quasi-sovereign act.25 If these considerations are not present,
there is no need for the injustice which results from a uniform refusal to
review foreign acts of state.26 When international law is applied, the ruling of the court can legitimately be identified as a manifestation of supranational authority, and not as enunciating executive policy or binding the
executive department to any position in foreign affairs. 27 The flavor of
intergovernmental dispute2s which is implicit whenever the executive department indicates that a court may examine a particular foreign act is
thus avoided. Moreover, the cumbersome, time-consuming, and often futile
"exhaustion of remedies" doctrine which now confronts a private litigant
in this area2 9 is replaced by a more expeditious court procedure which
the fact that the main thrust of Judge Dimock's reasoning (including the above quotation) came prior to an appraisal of executive attitude, that the court, in pointing this
out, was merely taking precaution against possible reversal by a higher tribunal which
might not agree with the basic premise advanced.
21

Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918).

22 Mann, Judiciary and Executive in Foreign Affairs, 29 GRorius SOCIETY TRANSACTIONS 143, 163 (1943).
23 See JAFFE, JuDiciAL AsPEcTs OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 8-75 (1938).
24 Mann, supra note 22, at 163.
25 Municipal laws are generally designed and enacted to promote sovereign policies

of government and in that sense can be said to emanate from the sovereign. Thus, a
judicial determination which utilizes these laws might be considered a quasi-sovereign
act. The same cannot be said, at least to the same degree, for the use of international
law, even though it has been incorporated into the municipal law of the state.
It has been suggested that if a foreign government objected that the court's decision
reflected the policy of the forum only or an interpretation of international law at variance with its own, the case could then be lifted to an intergovernmental level and, with
the consent of both governments, be litigated in the International Court of Justice.
Hyde, Editorial Comment, The Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 58 AM. J.
INT'L L. 635, 636 (1959).
26 Note, Acts of State and the Conflict of Laws, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 234, 244 (1960).
But see Comment, 1956 CAiM. L.J. 138, 139, suggesting that the weight of authority
favors such refusal.
27 Mann, supra note 22, at 162. See Zander, supra note 8, at 851.
28 Hyde, suPra note 25, at 636.
29 A claimant must take advantage of any opportunities to air his claim which are
afforded by the laws of the state where the contested act occurs. If he does not, the
Department of State will be loath to espouse his claim and an international tribunal will
not give him a hearing. Allison, Cuba's Seizures of American Business, 47 A.B.A.J.
48, 50-51 (1961). See generally 5 HAcaWORTH, DIGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 501-26
(1943). A municipal court's application of a legal remedy is not a quasi-sovereign
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can better weigh the strictly legal aspects of what may well be the material
fact in the case, the act of the foreign government. 30
Since the underlying reasons for application of the "act of state" doctrine
are inappropriate where international law may legitimately be applied,
there is every reason to hope that the Supreme Court will accept the
limitation on its use proposed by the court in the principal case.31 Abdication of judicial function to an executive department unequipped to
determine properly the rights of the parties is not satisfactory 32 and is not
necessary in cases like the present. 33 Many problems, of course, will emerge
from an increased scope of judicial examination, 34 but they will be predominantly pragmatic and can be dealt with as they individually mature.
The important thing, especially in international dealings, is that judicial
power be not unnecessarily circumscribed, but rather exercised to the
fullest reasonable extent. 35 Our courts' refusal to recognize foreign acts
which violate international law will tend to encourage foreign investment
and trade, and this in turn will speed development of an international
"Rule of Law" and provide a reliable framework in which to conduct international business affairs.
Lawrence Ray Bishop

act when international law is used and is, therefore, not subject to the policy considerations which impel the executive department to apply the "exhaustion of remedies"
doctrine.
30 Hyde, supra note 25, at 637.
31 The more liberal executive attitude toward allowing judicial review in the
closely-related sovereign immunity cases as evidenced by the recent adoption of the
"restrictive theory" should be an important factor influencing the Court's decision.
26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).

See generally Bishop, New United States Policy

Limiting Immunity, 47 Amt. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953); Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The
Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HAxv. L. Rav. 608 (1954).
32 Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions? 40 Ahr. J. INT'L
L. 168, 169 (1946).
33 The required decisions in this case are distinctly judicial, viz., the determination
of the title to property through the application of legal standards.
34 E.g., whether international law has been sufficiently defined to be capable of determination exclusive of national aims and policies. See generally BRMRLY, TiH LAW OF
NATIONs 42-46 (5th ed. 1955). Also, whether our courts are "adequately equipped to deal
with the burden of discovering (and applying) the international law on the subject."
Zander, supra note 8, at 842, 846-47.
35 See Mann, supra note 22, at 162.

